One of the consequences of Europe's sad history of religious persecution was the exodus of Jews from Spain and Portugal from 1391 onwards. The forcible conversion of the Jews to Catholicism led to an enduring suspicion and continued harassment of the conversos and in 1622 the parents of Spinoza left Portugal for the religious freedom of the new-founded Republic of the Netherlands. Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza was born in Amsterdam in 1632 into a Sephardic Jewish community many of whom had reconverted from Catholicism to Judaism. A key event in the life of this community was the case of Uriel D'Acosta whose ambivalences about faith resulted in several excommunications and re-admissions to the Amsterdam Jewish community, culminating in his eventual suicide. Spinoza was only eight at the time, but grew up in the aftermath of this tragedy.
Where Eckhart might be the least "lost" of our Western "buddhas" and perhaps even the closest to the Buddha in some aspects of his thought, Spinoza is another example of a great Western jnani lost because his work is now understood as philosophy; for example the Encyclopaedia Brittanica lists him as "Dutch-Jewish philosopher, the foremost exponent of 17th century Rationalism". Since the scholarly reconstruction of Eckhart began in the mid-nineteenth century his reputation as a spiritual teacher has grown, but Spinoza's contribution is mostly understood to be confined to philosophy, as is Plotinus's. Some consider Spinoza to be the first philosopher of the modern age, but this title usually goes to René Descartes, a precursor in many ways to Spinoza, and with evident jnani inclinations in his life and work. Of the two we have chosen Spinoza because, once one has dug below the formal surface of his work, it becomes clear that his spiritual intensity is the greater.
First we need to take a short look at the period in which Spinoza lived, the 17th century, a time that can be seen as a turning point for the civilisation of the West. The year 1600 saw the execution of Gordiano Bruno for heresy by the Inquisition, the publication of Shakespeare's Hamlet, and Gilbert's scientific essay On the Magnet. Galileo, Kepler and Newton created the scientific advances which formed the basis of modern science, the Royal Society was established in England and provided the impetus for the broadening of scientific investigation; and the philosophical mindset that encompassed and supported the scientific venture was created by Bacon and Descartes. The political philosophy of Hobbes and Locke emerged in response to the scientific ethos, the thirty years war ravaged Europe, and the English Civil War did the same for England. New literatures emerged with Molière, Milton, Bunyan and Racine, and early in the century the King James translation of the bible into English appeared; in the later part Pascal published his Pensées. New religious movements sprang up including the Quakers in England, founded by the extraordinary character of James Fox, and Jansenism in France. As we shall see, the character of the age was as religious as its precursors, but all the seeds were sown for the eventual triumph of secularism.
In addition two writers appeared whose most significant works were not published in their lifetimes or centuries, but who are important for our understanding of both the jnani temperament and for via positiva in the West: Thomas Traherne and Baruch Spinoza.
When the modern mind encounters Descartes' Discourse on Method or Spinoza's The Ethics it tends to either dismiss them because the subject of God is such a central issue, or "bracket out" such references, assuming that the works can be understood in an entirely secular way. An example of this is the abiding notion that Descartes created a duality in his res cogitans and res extensans (mind and matter); whereas in his writings his arguments depend entirely on a third entity, God, by which the first two are related. However, we are more interested in the "God" of these discussions than any formal contribution to philosophy, and our central issue with Spinoza is whether his "God" is that of a bhakti or a jnani. A useful clue is given by Samuel Shirley in his translator's preface to The Ethics:
Although Spinoza gives repeated warning that his 'Deus' is far from the anthropomorphic conception of God prevalent in the theology of his time, the reader will find it difficult to bear this constantly in mind. It is not until Ethics, Pr.14,I, that God, by definition, is shown to be identical with the infinite, all-inclusive, unique substance, and thereafter it is all too easy to lose sight of this, as the religious overtones of the word 'God' keep asserting themselves. So Spinoza's frequent use of the phrase 'Deus sive Natura'—God, or Nature—is intended as a salutary corrective. For Spinoza God is all Being, all Reality, in all its aspects and in all its infinite richness. (The Ethics, p.23)
This should alert us not only to the jnani orientation of Spinoza, but to a streak of via positiva in his thinking as well. The introduction to the same edition, by Seymour Feldman, reminds us that the German poet Novalis described Spinoza as a "God-intoxicated man," a description more usually attributed to the bhakti type. Richard Maurice Bucke cites Spinoza as one of the less-certain cases of "cosmic consciousness" (Bucke's general term for the attainment of transcendence), less certain only because there is no specific account of a transition into illumination. Bucke is telling us that we have to discover Spinoza through his texts, which is what we shall do in an attempt to settle the bhakti / jnani and via negativa / via positiva issues.
The Ethics is not the place to start however, but his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Neither were published in his own lifetime, and of the two, the second was not completed. But it contains Spinoza's account of his journey of discovery, not as Bucke would have liked in terms of a sudden illumination from the beyond, but, more like the account in Descartes' Discourse on Method, in terms of his aims and principles. Like almost all the great bhaktis and jnanis that we have discussed, he saw that he needed to find a source of joy that was beyond the transient, the impermanent, and the conditioned world, the so-called pleasures of which brought only anxiety in their wake. His ruminations on this issue are almost identical to the Buddha's, but with one exception: as he grew in his resolve and success in his venture he saw that:
the acquisition of money, sensual pleasure, and esteem is a hindrance only as long as they are sought on their own account, and not as means to other things. If they are sought as means, they will then be under some restriction, and far from being hindrances, they will do much to further the end for which they are sought, as I shall demonstrate in its proper place. (Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, 11)
This sentiment is in marked contrast to the jnanis and bhaktis of the Christian tradition that we have looked at, reminiscent in fact of the wholly maverick Thomas Traherne (born in fact just five years after Spinoza). In this next extract we have a further indication that we may have a case of via positiva; it also includes a terse jnani statement of transcendence:
But human weakness fails to comprehend that order in its thought, and meanwhile man conceives a human nature much stronger than his own, and sees no reason why he cannot acquire such a nature. Thus he is urged to seek the means that will bring him to such a perfection, and all that can be the means that will bring him to such perfection is called a true good, while the supreme good is to arrive at the enjoyment of such a nature, together with other individuals, if possible. What that nature is we shall show in its proper place; namely, the knowledge of the union which the mind has with the whole of Nature. (Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, 13)
Briefly noting a felicity about this statement that matches Traherne, it is of interest that he would like this enjoyment to be in the company of "other individuals, if possible". In fact he continues with the idea that he wants to bring as many as possible "to think as I do", and proposes a social order favourable to his end, including rules for living together. His prospects for achieving a social goal like this were remote in the extreme, as he was treated with suspicion on account of his ideas, and was even excommunicated from his Jewish community. His philosophy was later described as "the most monstrous hypothesis imaginable, the most absurd", or as a "hideous hypothesis," before Goethe and Coleridge made rescued his popularity. Spinoza's confidence and his intent at least match the Buddha's in creating a religious community or sangha. And in his assertion that the supreme good is "knowledge of the union which the mind has with the whole of Nature" (our italics) we have a jnani statement.
But is has to be admitted that Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect soon loses its way in a morass of technicalities concerning perception and knowledge. Despite this it notes the properties of the intellect in terms of the infinite and the eternal. If Spinoza in his being had rest in the infinite and eternal, or if at least these particular ideas had an experiential basis then we might suggest that he is at least aware of his Buddha-mind or Buddha-nature, as such qualities of mind can be described (incidentally we can ask just the same question of Descartes). If we now turn to The Ethics we find that it is in fact suffused with references to the infinite and the eternal, and to a God that is those things, and also a God to be loved and who "loves himself with an infinite intellectual love" (Proposition 35). This phrase alone alerts us to an utterly original expression of the spiritual-intellectual (i.e. jnani) life, and a short immersion in The Ethics will prove maddening, frustrating, and tantalising. It simply has so little relation to any other spiritual or philosophical work (though of course one can trace a host of influences) that one embarks on a turbulent sea without engine, compass or any idea of a destination. In Thomas Jesus says that the Kingdom of Heaven is for the "solitary and elect". Spinoza concludes The Ethics by saying "All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare." He is referring to the goal of the spiritual life, as Jesus was, but it is also true of his book.
Richard Maurice Bucke says of Leaves of Grass that it grew slowly on him, initially leaving no mark, but on subsequent reading displaying small pockets of light, until the whole lit up for him. In practice it is easier to selectively quote from Leaves than from The Ethics and still convey its flavour, but we have no choice but to select some passages from The Ethics, and merely suggest that for those with the right kind of mind a longer immersion will light up the entirety. The text is laid out as a pseudo-Euclidean argument consisting of an intertwined sequence of Propositions (the central ideas), Corollaries (related ideas), Scholia (commentaries), Postulates, Definitions and Axioms, but as Bertrand Russell points out the Propositions and Scholia (plus the occasional Appendix) are most worth reading. Even Russell, committed to the entire project of Western philosophy, admits that the "proofs" in Spinoza's Euclidean style of exposition are mainly spurious, where he would never do so for the Socratic dialogues. Yet we cannot suggest as with Socrates and the Buddha that Spinoza wished to 'numb' the minds of his readers — it is a great shame that we have no records of his conversation to help us in this matter.
Here is an impressionistic distillation of The Ethics, each fragment being selected by an instinctive rather than a rational process. Part I of The Ethics is called "Concerning God":
By God I mean an absolutely infinite being; that is, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence. (Definition 6, I)
God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists (Proposition 11, I)
There can be, or be conceived, no other substance than God. (Proposition 14, I)
Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God. (Proposition 15, I)
Some imagine God in the likeness of man, consisting of mind and body, and subject to passions. But it is clear from what has already been proved how far they stray from the true knowledge of God. These I dismiss, for all who have given any consideration to the divine nature deny that God is corporeal. (Scholium to Proposition 15,)
God acts solely from the laws of his own nature, constrained by none. (Proposition 17, I)
Furthermore, I have something here to say about the intellect and will that is usually attributed to God. If intellect and will do indeed pertain to the eternal essence of God, one must understand in the case of both these attributes something very different from the meaning widely entertained. For the intellect and will that would constitute the essence of God would have to be vastly different from human intellect and will, and could have no point of agreement except the name. (Scholium to Proposition 17)
God is the immanent, not the transitive causes of all things. (Proposition 18, I)
God, that is all the attributes of God, are eternal. (Proposition 19, I)
God's existence and his essence are one and the same. (Proposition 20, I)
All things that follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must have existed always, and as infinite; that is, through the said attribute they are eternal and infinite. (Proposition 21, I)
Nothing in nature is contingent, but all things are from the necessity of the divine nature determined to exist and to act in a definite way. (Proposition 29, I)
Things could not have been produced by God in any other way or in any other order than is the case. (Proposition 33, I)
--- For many are wont to argue on the following line: if everything has followed from the necessity of God's most perfect nature, why does Nature display so many imperfections, such as rottenness to the point of putridity, nauseating ugliness, confusion, evil, sin, and so on? But, as I have just pointed out, they are easily refuted. For the perfection of things should be measured solely from their own nature and power; nor are things more or less perfect to the extent that they please or offend human senses, serve or oppose human interests. As to those who ask why God did not create all men in such a way that they should be governed solely by reason, I make only this reply, that he lacked not material for creating all things from the highest to the lowest degree of perfection; or, to speak more accurately, the laws of his nature were so comprehensive as to suffice for the production of everything that can be conceived by an infinite intellect, as I proved in Proposition 16. (Appendix to Chapter 1)
This last passage contains the simplest and most direct argument for the perfection of existence, that everything we perceive as imperfect is only from our own perspective and not from the object in question. This way of seeing things can be called sub specie aeternitatis, that is "under the form of eternity", a phrase that Spinoza uses later on and has entered the language through him. We may remember that Heraclitus, though using a different expression of it, also saw the idea of imperfection as merely bound up in our preferences (indeed there is much that is Heraclitean in Spinoza). In these extracts so far, Spinoza has made God absolutely central, his chief qualities that of infinity and eternity, all things as existing solely in God, and all events predestined. Part II of The Ethics is titled "Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind," and here are some extracts:
I now pass on to the explication of those things that must necessarily have followed form the essence of God, the eternal and infinite Being; not indeed all of them—for we proved in Proposition 16 Part I that from his essence there must follow infinite things in infinite ways—but only those things that can lead us as it were by the hand to the knowledge of the human mind and its utmost blessedness. (Introduction to Part II)
By reality and perfection I mean one and the same thing. (Definition 6, II)
Thought is an attribute of God; i.e. God is a thinking thing. (Proposition 1, II)
The idea of God, from which infinite things follow in infinite ways, must be one and one only (Proposition 4, II)
All must surely admit that nothing can be or be conceived without God. For all are agreed that God is the sole cause of all things, both of their essence and their existence; that is God is the cause of things not only in respect of their coming into being (secundum fieri), as they say, but also in respect of their being. But at the same time many assert that that without which a thing can neither be nor be conceived pertains to the essence of the thing, and so they believe that either the nature of God pertains to the essence of created things or that created things can either be or be conceived without God.; or else, more probably, they hold no consistent opinion. I think that the reason for this is their failure to observe the proper order of philosophical enquiry. For the divine nature, which they should have considered before all else—it being prior both in cognition and in Nature—they have taken to be last in the order of cognition, and the things that are called objects of sense they have taken as prior to everything. Hence it has come about that in considering natural phenomena, they have completely disregarded the divine nature. And when thereafter they turned to the contemplation of the divine nature, they could find no place in their thinking for those fictions on which they had built their natural science, since these fictions were of no avail in attaining knowledge of the divine nature. So it is little wonder that they have contradicted themselves on all sides. (Scholium to Proposition 10, II)
We notice again Spinoza's positive outlook: that the human mind is characterised by its "utmost blessedness" and that reality and perfection are the same. In his argument against materialism in the Scholium to Proposition 10 he tells us that the fictions used to construct natural science are no use in "attaining knowledge of the divine nature." The problem with Spinoza is that he seems to write from knowledge of the divine nature, presenting us with a logical proof of it. He may have been entirely earnest in his belief that such an attainment is possible by following his arguments, or he may have deliberately hidden his illumination behind the mask of pseudo-logic (after all Whitman deliberately hid his illumination behind the metaphors in his poetry). Let him continue:
All ideas are true in so far as they are related to God. (Proposition 32, II)
A true idea in us is one which is adequate in God in so far as he is explicated through the nature of the human mind (Cor.Pr.11,II). Let us suppose, then, that there is a God, in so far as he is explicated through the nature of the human mind, an adequate idea, A. (Proof to Proposition 43, II)
It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary (Proposition 44, II)
It is in the nature of reason to perceive things in the light of eternity (sub quandam specie aeternitatis). (Corollary 2 to Proposition 44, II)
It is in the nature of reason to regard things as necessary, not as contingent (previous Pr.). Now it perceives this necessity truly (Pr.41,II); that is, as it is in itself (Ax.6,1). But (pr.16,I) this necessity is the very necessity of God's eternal nature. Therefore it is in the nature of reason to regard things in this light of eternity. Furthermore, the basic principles of reason are those notions (Pr.38,II) which explicate what is common to all things, and do not explicate (Pr.37, II) the essence of any particular thing, and therefore must be conceived without any relation to time, but in the light of eternity. (Proof to Proposition 44, II)
Every idea of any body or particular thing existing in actuality necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God. (Proposition 45, II)
The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which each idea involves is adequate and perfect. (Proposition 46, II)
The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. (Proposition 47, II)
As we are not primarily interested in logic, reason or proofs, we can explore Spinoza's statements in terms of how they reveal his own mind, or interiority. Spinoza only has direct access to Spinoza's mind, so when he tells us that "The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God" we are learning about his own illumination, or it is largely meaningless (Gandhi for example denied that the human mind could apprehend the imperishable). It can also be read as a statement of the jnani goal, but what it lacks entirely is a pedagogy, or a route to this transcendent condition, if we are to make this assumption about him. It is a serious assumption, certainly, because we place him in the same position as the Buddha. What we immediately note when we make this juxtaposition however is that where the Buddha regard "things as contingent" (in his doctrine of co-conditioned origination), Spinoza sees them as necessary, i.e. Spinoza sees the same issue through the eyes of via positiva.
Spinoza concludes Part II with a tacit admission that he is presenting a doctrine rather than an enquiry:
My final task is to show what practical advantages accrue from knowledge of this doctrine, and this we shall readily gather from the following points:
1. It teaches that we act only by God's will, and that we share in the divine nature, and all the more as our actions become more perfect and as we understand God more and more. Therefore this doctrine, apart from giving us complete tranquility of mind, has the further advantage of teaching us wherein lies our greatest happiness or blessedness, namely, in the knowledge of God alone, as a result of which we are induced only to such action as are urged on us by love and piety. Hence we clearly understand how far astray from the true estimation of virtue are those who, failing to understand that virtue itself and the service of God is happiness itself and utmost freedom, expect God to bestow on them the highest rewards in return for their virtue and meritorious actions as if in return for the basest slavery. (Concluding Scholium to Part II)
There is little in this that a Christian would argue with, other than a surprise at the circuitous route that Spinoza took to get there. True, there is the confidence that we "share in the divine nature" without the corresponding caveat in mainstream Christianity, that of original sin, but we could easily imagine Eckhart or St John of the Cross agreeing with this summary, or even stating it themselves. So this is a good moment to look back on these extracts and ask how anthropomorphic is Spinoza's God? Given that he several times makes clear that God is a "being", and that he has a Jewish background, from which the very concept of an anthropomorphic God arises, could we completely de-anthropomorphise his God without changing his meaning? We saw that to use the term "The One" or "The All" with Eckhart would leave a readable text, but would remove something of the active nature of Eckhart's God. With Spinoza we don't have this problem, and in fact Spinoza so often uses "God or Nature" instead of "God" that he does the work for us. By removing the word "God" entirely from Spinoza's text and using the Plotinian "One" for example we are left with a work that is jnani and almost Buddhist. As already pointed out, Spinoza's via positiva gives his work a very different emphasis and implication to the Buddhist ideal however.
Looking at a few more extracts we see Spinoza in aphoristic mood (a style found in Pascal and Nietzsche):
Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and may on the other hand be destroyed by love. (Proposition 43, III)
Hatred that is fully overcome by love passes into love, and the love will therefore be greater than if it had not been preceded by hatred. (Proposition 44, III)
For men are wont to form general ideas both of natural phenomena and of artefacts, and these ideas they regard as models. So when they see something occurring in Nature at variance with their preconceived ideal of the thing in question, they believe that Nature has then failed or blundered and has left that thing imperfect. So we see that men are in the habit of calling natural phenomena perfect or imperfect from their own preconceptions rather than from true knowledge. For we have demonstrated in Appendix, Part I that Nature does not act with an end in view; that the eternal and infinite being, whom we call God, or Nature, acts by the same necessity whereby it exists. (Preface, Part IV)
Knowledge of good and evil is nothing other than the emotion of pleasure or pain in so far as we are conscious of it. (Proposition 8, IV)
Whatever we endeavour according to reason is nothing else but to understand; and the mind, in so far as it exercises reason, judges nothing else to be its advantage except what conduces to understanding. (Proposition 26, IV)
We know nothing to be certainly good or evil except what is really conducive to understanding or what can hinder understanding. (Proposition 27, IV)
The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God. (Proposition 28, IV)
The good which every man who pursues virtue aims at for himself he will also desire for the rest of mankind, and all the more as he acquires greater knowledge of God. (Proposition 37, IV)
Spinoza's point that the more one acquires "knowledge" of God, the more one wishes this blessing on others is reflected in Buddhism as the Bodhisattva ideal, where one strives for the enlightenment of others. But in the next extract Spinoza reminds us again of his via positiva outlook :
I make a definite distinction between derision (which in Cr.II said is bad) and laughter. For laughter, and likewise merriment, are pure pleasure, and so, provided that they are not excessive, they are good in themselves (Pr.41,IV). Certainly nothing but grim and gloomy superstition forbids enjoyment. Why is it less fitting to drive away melancholy than to dispel hunger and thirst? The principle that guides me and shapes my attitude to life is this: no deity, nor anyone else but the envious, takes pleasure in my weakness and my misfortune, nor does he take to be virtue our tears, sobs, fearfulness and other such things that are a mark of a weak spirit. On the contrary, the more we are affected with pleasure, the more we pass to a state of greater perfection; that is, the more we necessarily participate in the divine nature. (Scholium to Proposition 45, IV)
Spinoza goes on to list good food and drink, blossoming plants, dress, music, sporting activities, theatres "and the like" as "nourishment" to the various parts of the body. The idea that greater pleasure leads us to greater perfection and to a greater participation in the divine nature is a rare sentiment indeed in the religious life, and shows again Spinoza's originality. Yet something of this must also come from the great Jewish tradition of the love of life, and the enjoyment of its pleasures. The Christian ideals of self-mortification and penance are not Judaic, except in that one extremely influential Jew, St. Paul, had reason to repent. We finish our selections on the subject of the love of God:
The mind can bring it about that all the affections of the body—i.e. images of things—be related to the idea of God. (Proposition 14, V)
He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and the more so the more he understands himself and the emotions. (Proposition 15, V)
This love towards God is bound to hold chief place in the mind. (Proposition 16, V)
He who loves God cannot endeavour that God should love him in return. (Proposition 19, V)
This love towards God cannot be tainted with emotions of envy or jealousy, but is the more fostered as we think more men to be joined to God by this same bond of love. (Proposition 14, V)
God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love. (Proposition 35, V)
The mind's intellectual love towards God is the love of God wherewith God loves himself not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explicated through the essence of the human mind considered under a form of eternity. That is the mind's intellectual love towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. (Proposition 14, V)
Taken as a group this set of propositions, almost a poem of divine love, represent one of the greatest statements of love from a Western jnani in the cultural context of a theistic language. We have pointed out at the beginning that jnani and bhakti reach exactly the same point in the end, where the heart of the bhakti is illuminated by spiritual intelligence, and the mind of the jnani illuminated by spiritual love; Spinoza one of the finest examples of the latter that we could wish for.
Osho (Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh) often regretted that D.H.Lawrence and Frederich Nietzsche had not been born in India, because he thought that in spiritual climate conducive to the transcendent both men would have attained — they had the insight and the passion. It is an idle, but overwhelmingly tempting thought: in what place or time could Spinoza have brought about his desire, a sangha or community which could have heard and profited from his teachings? For it is sure that 17th century Holland, despite its relative tolerance, was far from such a place. The answer must be in a world where secular freedoms had been guaranteed long enough for the spiritual longings, even if of a very few people, to acquire the hunger for a new Spinoza. In the next section we look at how the understanding of jnani and the related issues presented here can help us understand the triumph of secularism in the West.
