Was Socrates a Mystic?

September 1996

Part Three

Dissertation - 23,800 words

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Was Socrates a Mystic?
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Contents of Part 3
Part 2. Socrates in Plato and Xenophon
2.1. The Problem of the Historic Socrates
2.2. Evidence in Plato
2.2.1. The Nature of the Texts
2.2.2. General Evidence in Plato The Trial and Execution Fits of Abstraction Voices Socrates' Teachings on Immortality Socrates as Spiritual Master Socrates as Spiritual Midwife The Socratic 'Method' as Zen Koan No Small-Talk ...
2.2.3. The Phaedo
References for part 3

Part 2. Socrates in Plato and Xenophon

2.1. The Problem of the Historic Socrates

Scholars and historians generally accept that Socrates was a historical figure, and that he was tried and executed for impiety and corrupting the young. However, over two thousand years of debate has been conducted about the 'real' Socrates behind the literary pictures we have of him. Scholars have been divided over Plato and Xenophon as giving the most reliable picture of Socrates, with other sources (Aristophanes and Polycrates) having been more or less discounted by the eighteenth century [24]. Current scholarly interest in Socrates has been "stimulated to a large degree" by Gregory Vlastos, who considers Plato's Socrates in the early dialogues to be the historical one, [25] and that the Apology in particular can be considered the touchstone for Socrates in the other dialogues [26]. Mario Montuori, on the other hand, while citing Horneffer as confirming in 1922 the Apology "to be the most reliable source of an historical reconstruction of the Socratic personality" [27], devotes the larger part of his book Socrates - Physiology of a Myth to disproving this. He does this by an appeal to authority; placing crucial importance on the pronouncement of the Delphic Oracle on the status of Socrates: "... the Socratic image drawn by Plato rests entirely on the reply made by the Delphic god, and Socrates' mission among men and his tragic destiny are both indissolubly tied to and derived from it" [28]. He shows that this must have been an invention of Plato (despite the independent confirmation of the oracle by Xenophon [29]) and concludes that this destroys the Apology's reliability and shows that Socrates set himself above the law and was justly condemned (even though an otherwise virtuous man). Montuori's view are not widely taken up, as far as I can see, but his account is both useful from the historical summaries that he makes, and as an illustration of how authority is so often seen as central in Western analyses of religious ideas. If Socrates' status depends on the authority of an oracle, why is it we don't then examine all the human agencies involved in the oracle; if Jesus' authority depends on the Bible as the word of God, why don't we do the same for that?

Clearly this dissertation cannot settle age-old disputes regarding the historical picture of Socrates, but by approaching him from the perspective of mysticism different questions may be asked, and these will emerge as we examine Plato and Xenophon. The approach here will be not so much on reconstructing a historical figure as to reconstruct a consistent mystical personality, as one might for example if one had only fragments of Krishnamurti's dialogues. This is fraught with difficulties of course, and we have been warned off this course by the great Platonist and early translator of the dialogues, Thomas Taylor:

    Perhaps, however, some one may here object to us, that we do not in a proper manner exhibit the everywhere dispersed theology of Plato, and that we endeavour to heap together different particulars from different dialogues, as if we were studious of collecting together many things into one mixture, instead of deriving them all from one and the same fountain [30].

For Taylor the "one and the same fountain" is the Parminides, a dialogue by Plato purporting to show Socrates as a young man on the receiving end of a discourse by the aged Parminides, a Greek philosopher concerned with such topics as the one and the many, the like and the unlike, and so on. Central to the discussion, for Taylor, is the concept of the One, to be elaborated on much later by Plotinus. Taylor is in fact a neoplatonist, a tradition whose philosophy starts with Plato but is deeply indebted to Plotinus, and for this reason Taylor's assertion that the Parminides is the 'fountain' of all Platonic theology has to be treated with caution. In fact, I shall attempt what Taylor argues against: the collecting of evidence scattered through Plato's Socratic dialogues.

What of other scholars who may have examined the evidence for Socrates as mystic? Richard Maurice Bucke, whose criteria were listed above, places Socrates in the category of "lesser, imperfect, and doubtful instances." While considering that Socrates meets many of his criteria he uses his "fits of abstraction" (preferring in fact the term 'catalepsy') as a counter-indication [31]. I suggest, below, that this is positive evidence in fact, but, given that Bucke was an alienist (a psychologist in charge of a large sanatorium), his only encounter with such states would have been in the context of pathology. William James does not mention Socrates or Plato in the Varieties, even in the chapter on Philosophy. Evelyn Underhill, third of this early triumvirate of writers on mysticism, does make a number of references to Plato (though not Socrates) placing him as one of the lesser mystics along with Heraclitus, Wordsworth, Tennyson and Walt Whitman [32]. (Incidentally, though I think she deserves great respect for her seminal work on mysticism, I don't agree with her in connection with Heraclitus or Whitman.)

S. Abhayananda, in his History of Mysticism is more certain of Socrates as mystic, and casts his net much wider than Underhill in examples of the mystical type. He even mentions evidence in Aristoxenus (c. 330 BC) that Socrates met a number of Brahmins in the Athens of his day, though unfortunately gives no reference for this [33]. His discussion has some similarities with that presented here, but would be found by some to have pre-judged the case as this passage shows:

      To many, the figure of Socrates remains a mystery, but to the knowers of God, his teaching and manner of his life are clear as crystal, and he is dearly beloved; for only those who have trod the same path and realized the same Truth can know how pure was his soul and how wonderful his task in life and death [34].

Let us take a more dispassionate view of the evidence.

2.2. Evidence in Plato

2.2.1. The Nature of the Texts

Apart from Plato's Letters all of his works consist of dialogues, most of which have Socrates as the main or at least an important protagonist. In examining these dialogues we are attempting to establish whether they can be seen as proximity texts as defined above; that is, do they suggest to us the reports, however adumbrated, from a disciple about the life and teachings of his spiritual Master, a mystic? Or, are they the reports by a philosopher concerning the life and philosophy of another philosopher? Or was Plato himself the mystic? I will start by assuming that the dialogues are a reliable portrait of Socrates, build this portrait from a series of extracts, and only then consider the vital role of Plato.

2.2.2. General Evidence in Plato

It is now time to state the broad case behind the intuition that we can view Socrates as a mystic of the jnani type. The evidence for this in Plato is scattered throughout the dialogues, though some of the strongest claims can be made from just three of them: the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, and the Symposium. Before looking at these in detail I will summarise the evidence that crops up more generally, though in each case the type of evidence taken singly may not carry much weight: I am suggesting that it is the accumulation of these indicators that is significant. The Trial and Execution

The trial and execution of Socrates has parallels, in religion and mysticism, with that of Jesus and Mansur (a 10th century Muslim martyred in Baghdad), to give just two examples. Eckhart could easily have been a third parallel. It seems that Socrates was indicted on two counts: impiety, and corrupting the morals of the young. Plato devotes four dialogues, Euthyphro, The Apology, Crito, and Phaedo, to the events leading up to his trial and execution. The charge of impiety is not easily refuted, according to the evidence in Plato: Socrates was not readily inclined to accept the common views held on the gods and their activities, preferring to draw on his own inner resources in moral and religious questions. Plato does however show us that the idea that Socrates had a detrimental effect on the morals of the young was absurd, and essentially a trumped-up charge.

That a man in ancient times was executed for blasphemy of some kind or another is no proof of course that he was a mystic. However the way in which Socrates defended himself (in the Apology), and the way in which he faced death (in the Phaedo) are remarkable, and suggestive of the mystic. His defence was remarkable, for he made no attempt to counter the charges in a manner that would have led the court to leniency; his offer of a counter-punishment likewise calculated more to irritate than to ameliorate the death-sentence, and his calm, even joyful, acceptance of his sentence was compounded by refusals of offers to escape. Even the manner in which he took the hemlock was remarkable, and was commented upon by the executioner (who generally faced understandable hostility and complaints from those he delivered the hemlock to). Fits of Abstraction

Another, entirely different, piece of evidence for Socrates' status as mystic lies in the several accounts of his 'fits of abstraction'. I have put this term in quotation marks because I believe that we have come to use it in connection with Socrates without any clear idea of what it means, or what alternative terms we could use. In the West this term could mean anything from what was intended by the old-fashioned 'brown study' (an absent-minded state that required perhaps a vigorous interruption to recall its owner to his or her surroundings) to 'catatonic schizophrenia' (a state of complete unresponsiveness lasting for days, months or years, as with Nietzsche in his latter days). Bertrand Russell uses the term 'cataleptic trance,' [35] while Bucke, as we saw, preferred 'catalepsy.' However, in the context of mysticism it might easily be that his states are better described by the terms samadhi (Indian) or satori (Japanese) both of which mean a state of ecstatic union.

If Socrates' states were short in duration, and it was relatively easy to bring him out of them (snapping one's fingers, shouting, or even, as legend has it, the emptying of a chamber-pot over him by his wife) then the former terms, 'fits of abstraction' or 'brown study' might be appropriate. If the length of these states were longer and accompanied by a clear deterioration in mental health, then 'catatonic schizophrenia' might be appropriate. However, what the reports tell us are of states lasting from several hours to a day, where all attempts to reach him failed, followed by no adverse mental or physical effects. These reports have more similarities, I would suggest, with the spontaneous samadhis so well-documented (for example) of Ramakrishna and Ramana Maharshi (see cover page for the well-known photograph of Ramakrishna in samadhi: he is supported by a disciple because he was liable to fall and hurt himself).

Plato assumes that Socrates was either lost in thought, or needing to solve a problem during these states: we never hear however of the particular train of thought or solved problem resulting from a specific episode. Voices

A related phenomenon in Socrates' life seems to have been his hearing of a 'divine voice' or daimon. Oddly, Plato does not report these as directly linked to his 'fits of abstraction', and indeed they may have been a quite separate phenomenon. The lives of mystics are full of reports of divine voices, and this seems another not insubstantial piece of evidence. Socrates tells us that he heard this voice since childhood, and also mentions, in the Phaedrus that it only tells him to desist from something, never telling him what to do. This is problematic as evidence for mysticism, in that it might fall into the occult category. If the voice were that of an independent, autonomous, disembodied being such those posited by Steiner, or of an 'angel' as described in most traditions, then it would be an occult phenomenon. On the other hand it may have been Socrates' own intuition, and related more to the way that he also took note of his dreams (as in the case of those that prompted him to write poetry while awaiting execution). Socrates' Teachings on Immortality

Socrates' teachings, scattered throughout the dialogues, vary in character, that is in their mood or mode, in such a way as to leave some uncertainty about the whole picture. However, he is relatively consistent in his teachings on the immortality of the soul, presenting a system in fact that is almost a standard model of reincarnation with karmic consequences. Little adjustment is required for this model to fit Hindu or Buddhist thinking, and it is possible, given Abhayananda's assertion that Socrates met wandering Brahmins, that it came from the East (though Pythagoras is a more likely source). As mentioned earlier, however, reincarnation is essentially an occult topic, and not direct evidence of mysticism, other than it might inform the mystic's understanding of immortality. The clear conviction of the sense of immortality is evidence however, if we accept Bucke's criteria. Socrates as Spiritual Master

That Socrates was a Master of some kind or other is in little doubt, in the sense that Athenians of a certain type were drawn to him, and in some cases were practically devotees. More usually the picture presented of him is as a Master in the sense of an academic, a philosopher, or a rhetorician whose grasp of his subject was so profound and so compelling as to draw those to him who wished to learn these subjects. We have an image in the West of such an individual, quite divorced from a religious context, for whom it is right and proper to give such an extreme respect. The key quality of such an individual is intelligence, so a figure like Einstein, Marx, Freud or Jung fit the picture, or even perhaps Sartre when his young philosophy students would pester him in the local cafe.

The Eastern concept of the Master with whom one seeks to be present is hallowed by the concept of darshan, and the key quality of the target individual is not intelligence but spirituality. To be in the presence of the Master is a quite understandable ambition in the Indian tradition, though if taken too far the convention for most families is to put up a struggle before allowing the devotee to enter a full initiation into the religious life (through the Master). Socrates as Spiritual Midwife

Closely connected to the possibility of interpreting the actions of Socrates and his associates as that of Master with disciples is the image handed down through antiquity of Socrates as 'midwife'. Crombie in his shorter work on Plato subtitles it 'The Midwife's Apprentice' [36] and relates the midwife image to the important Platonic doctrine of anamnesis or recollection, while Burnyeat devotes a whole essay to the subject [37]. Burnyeat makes a typically Western assumption in this comment: 'The necessary background to the picture of Socrates as midwife, without which the whole elaborate fancy would lose its sense, is of course the metaphor of the mind giving birth to ideas it has conceived.' [38] In the context of Socrates as mystic a quite different interpretation can be put on the metaphor: Socrates is midwife to the spiritual birth of his disciples. In this case it is not concepts that are born in the minds of the disciples (though these will naturally arise) but a spiritual awakening more properly associated with a silence of the mind.

Plato has Socrates expound at length (over four pages in fact) on the midwife image in the Theatetus, and it is a strikingly bold and outrageous passage concluding with: 'It is quite clear that they have never learned anything from me; the many fine discoveries to which they give birth are of their own making. But to me and the god they owe their delivery.' [39] The spiritual Master generally makes the same claim, that the disciple has not in fact learned from them, but they were instrumental in the 'birth'. The Socratic 'Method' as Zen Koan

In Plato and Xenophon's Socratic dialogues we are invited to see a 'method' of question and answer that leads Socrates' partner to see the truth. The nature of these dialogues will be examined later on, but the parallels with the Zen koan, also a form of question and answer are again possible evidence that Socrates was a mystic. The Socratic 'method' is traditionally presented as an exercise in reason or logic, whereas the Zen koan seems to be an exercise in the opposite: their (or rather the Zen Master's) operation is eminently unreasonable and illogical. The end result in Zen is to bring the student to a point of confusion or impasse in which sudden insight can occur as a mystical phenomenon. Typical Zen koans may be the questions, "what is the sound of one hand clapping", or "what is your original face". Socrates' questioning takes a very different form, following a programme of questions, though in both cases a dialogue of sorts may ensue. Evidence in favour of viewing the Socratic questioning as similar to the koan is this: they often leave the recipient stultified or confused. In the Meno the analogy with a stingray is used to describe this numbing or perplexing effect, [40] though with typical Socratic involution he accepts the analogy only if he is also numbed (rendered ignorant). In the Symposium Alcibiades tells us that the conversation of Socrates is 'utterly ridiculous' to the uninitiated. No Small-Talk ...

Agehananda Bharati points out in his Light at the Centre [41] that mystics have little small-talk, and my own experience of living mystics confirms this. The type of mystic who is an active teacher or Master seems to enjoy the company of disciples (we see this to a great degree in Ramakrishna for example), and he or she will to a limited degree engage in normal conversation with them, but generally this is used as a spring-board to delve into mystical issues. They steer almost any conversation round to their teachings, and, I would suggest, if any other kind of teacher were to do this, they would be regarded as a boor, and avoided. True, I have given the example of Sartre in his cafe, attended by students hopeful of some insights from him, but I suspect this is a particularly French phenomenon; one cannot imagine a similar situation with Bertrand Russell for example. We shall see that Socrates conforms to Bharati's dictum, as he turns any and all conversations to the 'good'.

2.2.3. The Phaedo

It is time to take a detailed look at evidence to support the general points made above. I have chosen the Phaedo to concentrate on first, as it paints the clearest picture of Socrates as a mystic of the jnani type. This dialogue is the second of two dialogues portraying Socrates in prison awaiting his death sentence, the first being the Crito. Let us start with a report by Phaedo on how he encountered Socrates:

    The Master seemed quite happy, Echecrates, both in his manner and in what he said; he met his death so fearlessly and nobly. I could not help feeling that even on his way to the other world he would be under the providence of God. and that when he arrived there all would be well with him, if it ever has been so with anybody. So I felt no sorrow at all, as you might have expected on such a solemn occasion; and at the same time I felt no pleasure at being occupied in our usual philosophical discussions that was the form that our conversation took ; I felt an absolutely incomprehensible emotion, a sort of curious blend of pleasure and pain, as my mind took it in that in a little while my friend was going to die [42].

This passage is consistent with Socrates as Master (the very word is used in fact), and not only at ease with his impending death, but able to transmit some of this equanimity to Phaedo, who, as a close friend one might expect to be distraught. That they regard him as a Master is supported by this passage:

    'What you should do,' said Socrates, 'is to say a magic spell over him every day until you have charmed his fears away.'

    'But, Socrates,' said Simmias, 'Where shall we find a magician who understands these spells now that you are leaving us?'

    'Greece is a large country, Cebes,' he replied, 'which must have good men in it; and there are many foreign races too. You must ransack all of them in your search for this magician, without sparing money or trouble; because you could not spend your money more opportunely on any other object. And you must search also by your own united efforts; because it is probable that you would not easily find anyone better fitted for the task.' [43]

We can read this as Socrates acknowledging his role as Master, and encouraging them to seek another once he has been executed. One would not necessarily expect a non-spiritual Master (as profiled earlier) to face death so calmly: mere intelligence has never been an insurance against the fear of death; neither any guarantee of the kind of happiness that Socrates possessed (Bertrand Russell for example is considered to have been intensely unhappy most of his life). Socrates comments on the right attitude to death as being part of philosophy. He has dismissed his jailer's concerns that all their talking would excite him and make the administration of a second or third dose of poison necessary:

    'Never mind him,' said Socrates. 'Now for you, my jury. I want to explain to you how it seems to me natural that a man who has really devoted his life to philosophy should be cheerful in the face of death, and confident of finding the greatest blessing in the next world when his life is finished. I will try to make clear to you, Simmias and Cebes how this can be so.

    'Ordinary people seem not to realize that those who really apply themselves in the right way to philosophy are directly and of their own accord preparing themselves for dying and death. If this is true, and they have actually been looking forward to death all their lives, it would of course be absurd to be troubled when the thing comes for which they have been so long preparing and looking forward [44].

The first point to make about this extract is that Socrates is making a very odd definition of philosophy: a preparation for death. As far as I can tell this claim is made nowhere else in Plato, and elicits laughter from Simmias (one of those present) who points out that most of his fellow-countryman would think it a 'good hit' (i.e. fair criticism) of philosophers that they were half dead, and in fact that 'they, the normal people, are quite aware that death would serve the philosophers right.' Socrates responds that they were quite right 'except in thinking that they are "quite aware". They are not at all aware in what sense true philosophers are half dead, or in what sense they deserve death, or what sort of death they deserve.' In all likelihood Simmias is referring not to the type of philosopher that we know today, or even the type that Socrates was portraying, but the Sophists, who were teachers of rhetoric, and had a bad reputation for their supposed ability to argue a case regardless of its merits.

What follows in the Phaedo makes it clear in what sense Socrates sees his 'philosophy' as a preparation for death: it is a form of renunciation. He is 'half-dead' to the sensible world in order to be more greatly alive to the divine order:

    'So it is clear first of all in the case of physical pleasures that the philosopher frees his soul from association with the body (so far as it is possible) to a greater extent than other men?'

    'It seems so'.

    'And most people think, do they not, Simmias, that a man who finds no pleasure and takes no part in these things does not deserve to live, and than anyone who thinks nothing of physical pleasures has one foot in the grave?'

    'That is perfectly true.'

    'Now take the acquisition of knowledge; is the body a hindrance or not, if one takes it into partnership to share an investigation? What I mean is this: is there any certainty in human sight and hearing, or is it true, as the poets are always dinning into our ears, that we neither hear nor see anything accurately? Yet if these senses are not clear and accurate, the rest can hardly be so, because they are all inferior to the first two. Don't you agree?'


    'Then when is it that the soul attains to truth? When it tries to investigate anything with the help of the body, it is obviously led astray.'

    'Quite so.'

    'Is it not in the course of reflection, if at all, that the soul gets a clear view of facts?'


    'Surely the soul can best reflect when it is free of all distractions such as hearing or sight or pain or pleasure of any kind that is, when it ignores the body and becomes as far as possible independent, avoiding all physical contacts and associations as much as it can, in its search for reality.'

    'That is so.'

    'The here too in despising the body and avoiding it, and endeavouring to become independent the philosopher's soul is ahead of the all the rest.' [45]

In this long extract we have most of essential evidence (though not in the necessary bulk for a final verdict) to construct Socrates as a mystic of the jnani type, whose orientation is to via negativa. We should first of all notice that Socrates is concerned with an inquiry into truth, but not into the truth about anything in particular, more a Truth that the soul attains to, i.e. a state. The body is seen as a hindrance to this inquiry, and the senses of no use. It is in the course of reflection that Truth is attained. Our difficulty, as throughout, is what interpretation we should put on the word reflection. I have proposed earlier that it is usually taken to be a form of cogitation (as defined above) though possibly a highly refined sort. What happens if we read it as meditation (as defined above)? My suggestion is that it makes the passage more intelligible, rather than less. However, we need to examine more of Plato to see if this interpretation is reasonable. For now it is worth noting that the body is not just an inconvenience, it is to be despised. Let us look at a Buddhist text for a similar attitude to the body Sutra 11 of the Dhammapada, 'Age':

    Why is there laughter, why merriment, when this world is on fire? When you are living in darkness, why don't you look for light?

    This body is a painted image, subject to disease, decay and death, activated by thoughts that come and go. What joy can there be for him who sees that his white bones will be cast away like gourds in the autumn?

    Around the bones is built a house, plastered over with flesh and blood, in which dwell pride and pretence, old age and death. Even the chariot of a king loses its glitter in the course of time; so too the body loses its health and strength. But goodness does not grow old with the passage of time.

    A man who does not learn from life grows old like an ox: his body grows, but not his wisdom.

    I have gone through many rounds of birth and death, looking in vain for the builder of this body. Heavy indeed is birth and death again and again! But now I have seen you, house-builder, you shall not build this house again. Its beams are broken; its dome is shattered: self-will is extinguished; nirvana is attained.

    Those who have not practised spiritual discipline in their youth pine away like old cranes in a lake without fish. Like worn-out bows they lie in old age, sighing over the past [46].

This sutra is laden with many images and metaphors for which there is insufficient space here to expand upon, but the attitude to the body is clear enough, as is the sense of liberation that is possible through 'goodness', 'wisdom', 'spiritual discipline' and so on all of which are implicit in Socrates' 'philosophy'. A simple correspondence between the thought of the Buddha and that of Socrates is not being suggested here; merely that both share the chief concerns of a renunciate jnani, and both neglect the chief concerns of the bhakti. The fact that Socrates was an accomplished professional soldier and had a legendary capacity for drink are just two examples of personal characteristics quite at odds with what we know of the life of the Buddha, and would lead to differing articulations of the jnani concept.

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References for Part 3

[24] Montuori, Mario, Socrates-Physiology of a Myth', Amsterdam: J.C.Gieben, 1981, p. 30 and 31
[25] Brickhouse, Thomas, and Smith, Nicholas, Plato's Socrates, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. vii
[26] Brickhouse, Thomas, and Smith, Nicholas, Socrates on Trial, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 2
[27] Montuori, Mario, Socrates-Physiology of a Myth', Amsterdam: J.C.Gieben, 1981,p. 42
[28] Montuori, Mario, Socrates-Physiology of a Myth', Amsterdam: J.C.Gieben, 1981, p. 59
[29] Xenophon Conversations of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield, London: Penguin, Socrates' Defence, p. 44
[30] Taylor, Thomas, The Six Books of Proclus, the Platonic Successor, on the Theology of Plato, London: Law, Longman, Baldwin, 1816, p. 17
[31] Bucke, R.M. Cosmic Consciousness - A Study in the Evolution of the Human Mind, Olympia Press, London, 1972, p. 213
[32] Underhill, E. Mysticism - The Nature and Development of Spiritual Consciousness, Oneworld Publications, Oxford, UK, 1993, p. 238
[33] Abhayananda, S. History of Mysticism - The Unchanging Testament, Atma Books, Naples, Florida, 1987, p. 89
[34] Abhayananda, S. History of Mysticism - The Unchanging Testament, Atma Books, Naples, Florida, 1987, p. 99
[35] Russell, Bertrand, A History of Western Philosophy, London, Sidney, Wellington: Unwin Paperbacks, 1989, p. 107
[36] Crombie, I.M. Plato, The Midwife's Apprentice, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964
[37] Burnyeat, M.F. "Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration" in Benson, H.H., Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp 53-56.
[38] Burnyeat, M.F. "Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration" in Benson, H.H., Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 54
[39] Plato, Works, English, Trans.: Jowett, Oxford, 1964, Vol III, p. 245
[40] Plato, Protagoras and Meno, Trans.: W.K.C.Guthrie, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981, p. 128
[41] Bharati, Agehananda, The Light at the Centre - Context and Pretext of Modern Mysticism, Ross-Erikson / Santa Barbara 1976
[42] Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, p. 100
[43] Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, p. 128
[44] Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, p. 107
[45] Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, Trans.: Hugh Tredennick, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969, p. 109
[46] Easwaran, Eknath (Trans.) The Dhammapada, London: Arkana, p. 116

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